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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
VIRGINIA REESP 
Plaintiff & Respondent 
-vs-
GEORGE ARCHIBALD 
Defendant & Appellant 
) 
) 
CASE No. 8619 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
I. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS: 
Respondent agrees with Appellant's state-
ment of facts as set forth. 
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II. 
RESPONDENTtS ANSWER TO APPELLANT'S 
Point ( 1 ) 
The evidence is clear that the son was in 
an automobile accident; That he was taken to 
Madison Memorial Hospital. (Appellant's 
Statement of Facts. ) 
It is clear that he was hospitalized 
there from November 18, 1954 to February 25, 
1955. ( Exhibit P-1 and Plaintiff's interroga-
tory No. IV., defendant's Answer No. 4.) 
Examination of Exhibit P-1, should dem-
onstrate to this Court that the trial Court did 
not abuse its discretion in finding that the hos-
pita1 care was requisite for the health and well-
being of the child. Examination of Exhibit P-1 
reveals: 
"1/13/55 . . . . . . $20. 00 ...... Blood 
"1/16/55 ...... $10. 00 ••••• 0 Blood 
"1/14/55 ...... $55. 00 . ..... Surgery 
II 11/19/54 • • o. • $22.50 •••• 0 0 Surgery 
"1/14/55 ...... $18.00 ...... Cast 
"1/19/55 .••... $ 8.00 ...... Cast, 
and there are many charges for X=Rays and 
dressings. 
It is submitted that all of the foregoing 
adequately demonstrates that the child needed 
the care he received. As a matter of law, the 
foregoing at least shifts the burden of going 
forward with the evidence to defendant to sup-
port his claim that said treatment was not 
necessary, and it is clear that Defendant-
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Respondent did not so go forward. 
As to Appellant 1 s contention that there 
was no showing that no part of the hospital bill 
was paid and therefore, Defendant-Appellant 
should not have to pay it 9 it is respectfully 
urged as elemental that the defense of pay-
ment is an affirmative one. 
Defendant admits he paid nothing. See 
Page 4 of Appellant's brief: "Appellant does 
not here contend that he had paid on the 
account o o o " 
That is all Plaintiff ever alleged 
claiming the full amount due from Defendant. 
Plaintiff claimed the account was all due from 
Defendant and Exhibit P-1 shows it all due. 
If Defendant claims payment on account by 
someone else~ it is his burden to show pay-
ment by an affirmative allegation and prooL 
There is no such affirmative defense pleaded. 
Rule 8 (c), U.R. Co Po provides that 
payment as a defense must be affirmatively 
pleaded. 
Plaintiff alleged Defendant didn't pay. 
Defendant admits he didn't pay. If he claims 
someone else paid, he must allege and prove 
it. Defendant-Appellant did neither. 
III. 
RESPONDENT 'S- ANSWER TO .APPELLANT'S 
POINTS (2}, (3 )y and (4}o 
The questions as to reasonableness of 
treatment have been discussed by Respondent 
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in its Paragraph 11, hereof, and it is suggested 
that Appellant's approach to that problem is 
one borne of desperation, with an abdication of 
decency in that it is obvious from Exhibit P -1 
that Appellant's son was seriously and critically 
injured, not taking into consideration that the 
father had personal knowledge of that because 
of his visit to the hospital. See Transcript 9 
Page 4, Line 24 9 et seq. 
The next point for consideration would be 
this precept: 
IS A FATHER RELIEVED OF HIS DUTY 
TO SUPPORT HIS MINOR NATURAL 
CHILD MERELY BECAUSE A DIVORCE 
DECREE AWARDING CUSTODY. TO HIS 
WIFE IS SILENT AS TO PROVISIONS 
FOR SUPPORT OF THE MINOR CHILD? 
Respondent claims that the jurisdictions 
answering the above query in the affirmative 
are in the minority. 
Respondent claims that reason and human= 
ity demand that such question be answered 
against Defendant -Appellant. 
At 15, A. L. R. 569, this language is 
found: 
"II. MAJORITY RULE 
(a) Rule Stated" 
"The rule supported by the weight of 
authority is that a father is not released from 
his obligation to support or contribute to the 
support of his infant children by reason of the 
fact that the mother has been granted an abso-
lute decree of divorce from him, and has been 
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awarded the custody of the children by a decree 
making no provision for their maintenance." 
There follows this statement a great num-
ber of cases 9 supra. 
At 159 ALR9 574, it is stated that the min-
ority doctrine appears to be the law in California, 
but that such result is a creature of statute, the 
Court in the case of Selfridge-vs<~Paxton, 145 
Cal. 713; 79 Pac. 427, saying: 
"Whatever may be thought as to how 
the law should be on this subject, we 
must take it to be as written in the 
Code." 
There is no statute in Utah or Idaho thus 
exonerating a father from supporting his minor 
children, and certainly no precept permitting 
a father to refuse to pay for medical attention 
and care that undoubtedly was not only reason-
able9 but probably saved the child's life. 
The Annotation in 15, A. L. R., 574 is 
further supplemented at 81 A. L. R. , 888, 
wherein is contained a great number of more 
recent cases adhering to the so-called major= 
ity rule 9 in support of Plaintiff-Respondent's 
position. 
The precise question above referred to 
has not subsequently been Annotated in A. L. R. 
However, at 7 A. L. R. 2nd. 491, the position of 
plaintiff=respondent is again stated as being 
the rule of "weight of authority. '' 
The case of Dodge -vs -Keller, cited by 
Appellant at Page 8 of its brief 9 Annotated at 
7 A. L. R. 2nd. 494, stands for the proposi-
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tion that a decree providing for stated support 
payments puts a ceiling on or limits a father's 
liability for s·upport. 
The Dodge case furnishes no precedent 
to support Appellant's theory. 
Appellant at Page 8 of his brief pre= 
sents views from one of the jurisdictions ad-
hering to the so-called "minority ru1e." See 
15, A. L. R. 573, and 81 A. L. R. 894, wherein 
it is announced in both volumes that New York 
follows the minority rule. 
The same minority views are repre-
sented by Judson-vs=Judson9 171 Mich. 195; 
137 N. W. 103; and Burritt-vs-Burritt, 29 
Barb. N.Y. 124, both being cited at Page 6 
of Appellant's brief. 
ARGUMENT 
It is submitted that Appellant's argu-
ments upon reasonable necessity of services 
rendered is specious, if not unmoral, in 
view of item designations listed in Exhibit 
P-1. 
Further Exhibit P -1, at the least, 
shifts the burden of going forward with the 
evidence to Appellant, who has not overcome 
the prima facie case thus presented by Re-
spondent. 
The inference that there was payment 
on the account should not be considered be-
cause Appellant admits he didn't pay it, as 
Respondent alleged, and the affirmative de-
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fense of payment as required by our Rules was 
not pleaded. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant should be required to furnish 
the necessaries received by his minor child 9 
such requirement, in kind or in money being 
recognized in all societies since time immem-
orial. 
The decision of the trial Court should be 
sustained 9 aligning Utah with the majority of 
jurisdictions requiring a father to care for his 
children even if a decree of divorce happens 
to be silent pertaining thereto, which omissions 
could possibly be results of ~hreats or inept 
counsel. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GEORGE E. BRIDWELL 
Attorney for Plaintiff-
Respondent 
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Received (2) true copi~s hereof this-----
day of March, 1957. 
Attorneys for Appellant · ~ 
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